INTRODUCTION
It is often asserted that the rising oil demand from China is one of the main reasons for the increase in oil prices over the period of [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . Indeed since China became a net importer in the world oil market in 1993, China's oil consumption has risen quickly. Because the domestic oil production in China has remained largely flat, the increase in consumption is mainly satisfied by increases in import. Figure 1 displays China's net oil import which includes the net import in both crude oil and refined petroleum products from January 1997 to June 2010. During this period, China's net import has increased by almost five times with an annual average growth rate of 15.75 percent. It is probably this rapid growth in China's oil import that has attracted much attention from the media. Also shown in Figure 1 is the front month futures price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) which is deflated using the US consumer price index(CPI) and expressed in January 2009 levels. While both series appear to have a common upward trend, how much China's import has contributed to the world oil price remains an open question.
A systematic examination of the relationship between China's import and oil prices in the world market can help us disentangle various factors behind oil price changes. The surge in crude oil prices from 2002 to mid-2008 has spurred a new wave of heated debate over the causes and consequences of the oil price shocks. Some of the significant contributions in the academic literature include Kilian (2009), Smith (2009) and Hamilton (2009a Hamilton ( , 2009b . Kilian (2009) distinguishes oil price shocks between oil supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks, and precautionary demand shocks that are specific to the oil industry and argues that the recent oil price run-up until mid-2008 is primarily driven by booming aggregate demand. He finds that the demand-driven shocks have very different effects on the real price of oil and tend to impact the real economic activity differently from supply-driven oil price shocks. Hamilton (2009a) reviews several strands of theories about oil prices including the cash-and-carry model, the futures market theory and Hotelling's scarcity rent theory and relates them to statistical evidence. He concludes that the scarcity rent may have started to become an important factor in the price of crude oil owing to the strong demand growth from China, the Middle East and other emerging economies. Hamilton (2009b) analyzed the causes and consequences of the oil price shock of [2007] [2008] and argues that it was caused primarily by a combination of strong demand growth and stagnating production. Smith (2009) analyzes the global demand shift, non-OPEC and OPEC supply shifts relative to [1973] [1974] [1975] levels and concludes that a substantial part of the oil price rise since 2004 can be explained by a combination of unexpected demand growth from China and other developing nations and a 
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Notes: WTI is the front-month futures price of West Texas Intermediate. The real oil price is obtained by deflating WTI by the U.S. consumer price index (January ‫.)001ס9002‬ CNIMP denotes China's net import of both crude oil and refined products. The solid line denotes the real price of oil. The dotted line denotes China's net oil import.
negative shift in oil supply due to higher factor costs. While both Hamilton (2009a Hamilton ( , 2009b and Smith (2009) argue that the demand growth from China has been an important factor, neither attempted to assess the relative importance of the "China factor" in oil prices. This paper employs monthly time series data on China's net oil import and the international benchmark crude oil prices over the period of January 1997 to June 2010 to assess the role of China's demand growth in the world oil price run-up. We focus on China's net import for two reasons. First, data on net import is readily available. Chinese Customs typically releases the data on monthly import and export of crude oil and refined petroleum products within two weeks after the end of each month. As there is no official statistics on oil inventory changes at monthly or weekly levels in China, the import and export statistics has become almost the most important single barometer for industry analysts and traders to gauge China's oil demand. Second, since China is a net importer in the world oil market during this period, changes in Chinese net import effectively represent demand changes in the world oil market.
In the first part of our empirical analysis, we estimate a vector autoregression (VAR) model and perform impulse response analysis, forecast error variance decomposition and historical decomposition to investigate the interaction between China's oil demand and the real price of oil. In addition, we also conduct 1. The futures price data used in this study is highly correlated with the U.S. refiners' acquisition cost for imported crude oil used by Kilian (2009) . The sample correlation coefficient is 0.998. Using Bai and Perron's (1998) methodology for multiple structural changes, we find no evidence of structural breaks in the logged real oil price during the sample period.
out-of-sample Granger causality tests to examine the causal relationship between China's oil demand and the real oil price. In general, our results suggest that the growth rate of China's net oil import has only a small impact on the real oil price and that there is no Granger causality between the two variables. The second part of our analysis, from a longer-term demand and supply shift perspective, answers the question how much price change is required in order to increase the crude oil supply to meet China's growing demand based on plausible estimates of price elasticity of crude oil supply. The result indicates, on average, the growth in China's net oil import has contributed to about 11-23 percent of the price increase between 2002 and mid-2010 depending on assumed supply elasticities. Notably, both the historical decomposition from the VAR analysis and the longer-term demand and supply shift analysis suggest that the share of the real oil price change attributable to China's demand growth is lower in the price spike of 2008 than the average estimates for the full sample period.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data and reviews the empirical methodology used in this study. Section 3 reports the empirical results from our VAR analyses. In Section 4 we conduct the longerterm demand and supply shift analysis. Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY

Data
The nominal oil price data is the monthly averages of the daily settlement price of WTI front-month futures and obtained from the Energy Information Administration (hereafter, EIA) of the US Department of Energy. 1 We deflate the nominal oil price by the US consumer price index (CPI) and express it at the January 2009 level. The unit root tests in Table 1 indicate that the logged real oil price is stationary when a deterministic trend is included. We thus remove the linear trend from the series and use the detrended logged real oil price (DTLRWTI) in our empirical model.
We obtain China's net import of crude oil and refined petroleum products (liquid products only, measured in million barrels per day) from the General Administration of Customs of China. The data spans the period January 1997-June 2010. As shown in Table 1 , while the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock DF-GLS (DF-GLS) tests find some weak evidence of the series being trend-stationary at the 10% level, the Ng-Perron and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests show that the series is a unit root process rather than trend-stationary. In this study we use the year-over-year 2. In addition, we also applied Johansen's cointegration test on the logged oil price and the logged China's net oil import while allowing for a linear deterministic trend, and found no evidence that these two series were cointegrated. Detailed results from Johansen's cointegration test are not reported but available upon request. growth rate of China's net oil import (CNIMPG, referred to as seasonal difference in Table 1 ), which is defined as the log difference of China's net oil import between month t and month t-12.
2 As such, we lose the first 12 observations and the sample period used in our main empirical analysis runs from January 1998 to June 2010.
To control the possibility that changes in crude oil supply drive the relationship between China' net oil import and the oil price, we include the percentage change in world crude oil production (WDPROG) in our empirical analysis. The world crude oil production data (measured in thousands barrels per day) is also available from the EIA. As evident in Table 1 , both the world oil production growth and China's net oil import growth are covariance stationary.
Empirical Model
To analyze the dynamic relationship between China's net oil import growth and the real price of oil, we estimate a three-variable vector autoregression (VAR) model over the entire sample period as follows:
3. An example of oil supply shocks could be a disruption of oil production in one of the oil producing countries such as Nigeria.
4. This restriction is plausible for two reasons. First, over the study period, the price of crude oil sold domestically in China is indexed to international benchmark oil prices with one month's lag; the international oil price is unlikely to have an immediate impact on China's import. Second, it takes several weeks to ship oil from Middle East and western Africa, where China imports most of the crude oil, to China. Even if the international oil price has an immediate impact on China's import decision, the cargo is unlikely to arrive at a Chinese port and to be accounted in the customs' statistics within a month. In this model, first, we assume that the world oil production growth contemporaneously responds to only its own shocks (hereafter referred to as "oil supply shocks"). 3 Due to the long-lead time and capital intensive nature of petroleum production projects, the price elasticity of crude oil supply in the short-term is extremely low. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that crude oil production does not respond to innovations in demand and prices within the same month. Second, we assume that China's net oil import growth is contemporaneously affected by only oil supply shocks and shocks to China's oil demand (referred to as "China's oil demand shock" hereafter), but not shocks to international crude oil prices. 4 Last, we refer innovations to the real oil price that cannot be explained by either oil supply shock or China's oil demand shocks as other demand shocks, which potentially represent all other countries' oil demand shocks and the "precautionary demand" shocks referred to by Kilian (2009) . We assume that the real oil price responds contemporaneously to all three types of shocks including oil supply shocks, China's demand shocks and also other demand shocks.
5. We believe our indentifying restrictions in equation (2) are reasonable. Nevertheless, our results from the impulse response function and variance decomposition are robust to different orderings of the variables.
6. We also conducted the in-sample F test for Granger causality between China's net oil import growth and real oil price based on the baseline VAR model and found no evidence for causation between these two variables.
Based on these identified shocks, we then employ impulse responses analysis, forecast error variance decomposition, and also historical decomposition to investigate how the real price of oil is impacted by each of these shocks. 
Out-of-sample Granger Causality Tests
To further understand the role of China's oil demand in the evolution of the real oil price, we also conduct out-of-sample tests to check whether China's net oil import growth Granger causes changes in the real oil price. While the insample Granger causality tests have been widely employed in previous studies on causality, the value of in-sample evidence of Granger causality may not be very reliable in the sense that it could simply be an artifact of the specification searches used in obtaining empirical models. In contrast, as pointed out by Ashley et al. (1980) , an out-of sample comparison of forecasting performance can yield the maximum amount of information that is relevant to the hypothesis of Granger causation and thus is more in the spirit of the definition of Granger causality. Thus, we employ out-of-sample Granger causality tests here to study the causal linkage between China's net oil import growth and the real oil price.
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The out-of-sample tests for Granger causality from China' net oil import growth to the detrended log real price of oil are implemented in two steps. In the first step, we estimate both the restricted and unrestricted models for the real oil price. Specifically, the unrestricted model for the real oil price is simply the last equation in the VAR(3) model (Eq. (1)) that has the detrended log of the real oil price as the dependent variable, while the restricted model for the real oil price is the unrestricted model without the lagged values of China's net oil import growth variable. In the second step, formal statistical tests are employed to examine whether the out-of-sample mean squared forecast errors (MSFE) from the unrestricted model are smaller than those obtained from the restricted one. If the unrestricted model for the real oil price improves forecast accuracy over the restricted model by yielding significantly smaller MSFE, China's net oil import growth is said to have predictive power for the real oil price, and thus is considered to be evidence for China's net oil import growth Granger causing movements in the real oil price. Granger causality from the real oil price to China's net oil import growth is tested similarly.
In this study we consider five out-of-sample tests recently developed in the literature of forecast evaluation: the Granger-Newbold (1976) 
The Bootstrap Method
Given that we have a relatively small sample, the statistical inference based on asymptotic distributions may be problematic. We use the bootstrapping method (with 5000 replications) to obtain the confidence intervals for impulse responses and forecast error variance decompositions, and the p-values for rejecting the null hypothesis of equal MSFE for the restricted and unrestricted models. 8 Let , t‫,1ס‬ . . ,T, denote the OLS residuals from the VAR (3) the centered residuals. From these bootstrap residuals, we then construct artificial time series of world oil production growth (WDPROG), China's net oil import growth (CNIMPG) and the detrended log of the real oil price (DTLRWTI) using the VAR(3) as the bootstrap data generating process (DGP).
9
For each of these 5000 artificial datasets, we then construct the 95 (68) percent confidence intervals for the impulse responses and forecast error variance decomposition using the 2.5th (16th) and the 97.5th (84th) percentiles of their empirical distributions as lower and upper bounds, respectively. The p-value for each of the out-of-sample Granger causality test statistics is calculated as the proportion of the generated test statistic values exceeding the test statistic value obtained using the actual sample data.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS FROM VAR
Results from Innovation Accounting
Figure 2 graphs the point estimates of impulse responses of the real oil price to one-standard-deviation structural shocks along with their bootstrapped 95 percent and 68 percent confidence intervals. Given a positive one-standard deviation structural shock to China's oil demand (i.e. raising China's net oil import), the real oil price first rises for about seven months and then declines gradually. Six months after shock, the real oil price rises by about 1.5 percent. Based on the bootstrapped 95 percent confidence intervals, however, the positive impact of China's demand shock on the real price of oil is not statistically significant at Understanding the Crude Oil Price: The China Factor / 77 Notes: The percentage share of total forecast error variance of the real oil price (in logarithm, detrended) attributed to each one of the three structural shocks at horizon h is obtained from the estimated VAR(3) model that include world oil production, China's net oil import growth and the logged real oil price (detrended). Their 95% confidence intervals are constructed using the bootstrap method with 5000 replications and reported in brackets.
10. Based on the 68 percent confidence intervals, we notice that the impulse responses of real oil price to China's demand shock are statistically significant, at the 32 percent level, between the 9th month and 11th month after the shock. the five percent level.
10 With respect to positive oil supply shocks (i.e. raising world oil production), the real oil price drops slightly for the first seven months, with a maximum fall of 0.75 percent two months after the shock. The 95 percent confidence intervals for the responses of the real oil price to oil supply shocks, yet again, suggest that the negative effect of oil supply shocks on the real oil price is statistically insignificant. The last panel of Figure 2 shows the response of oil price to other oil demand shocks. With a positive one-standard deviation shock, the real oil price rises on impact for roughly eight months. The real price of oil is expected to increase by 10 percent or so within the first three months and then the positive impact starts to diminish slowly. As indicated by the 95 percent confidence intervals, the positive impact of other oil demand shocks on the real oil price is statistically significant at the five percent level.
In Table 2 we report the percentage contributions of the three identified shocks to the forecast error variance of the real oil price at various horizons. China's oil demand shock turns out to have limited explanatory power for the movements in the real oil price. The proportion of the real oil price variation accounted for by China's oil demand shocks at the one-year horizon is 2.68 percent, with the 95 percent confidence interval extending from 0.25 percent to 24.87 percent. Over time the proportion of forecast error variance of the real oil price due to China's oil demand shock rises slightly but remains less than three Understanding the Crude Oil Price: The China Factor / 79 percent at any time horizons. As compared to China's oil demand shock, oil supply shock explains even less amount of forecast error variance of the real oil price. The proportion of forecast error variance contributed by oil supply shock is around 0.2 percent at any horizons. The majority of the variation in the real oil price, unsurprisingly, is induced by other oil demand shock. It accounts for about 99 percent of the variation in the real oil price at the three-month horizon, with the 95 percent confidence interval extending from 86.26 percent to 99.43 percent. As time passes, its explanatory power for the movements in the real oil price decreases somewhat yet still remains at the level of around 97 percent. To gain further insight into the effects of the three identified shocks on the behaviour of the real oil price over time, we plot in Figure 3 the historical contributions the three shocks have made to fluctuations in the real price of oil. Among the three shocks, oil supply shock has made the smallest contribution to the fluctuations in the real oil price, with a size of less than three percent change in the real oil price. Nonetheless, the result is consistent with Kilian's (2009) finding. As compared to the oil supply shock, China's oil demand shock has had a slightly larger effect on the evolution of the real oil price. After the 1997 Asian financial crisis (i.e. 1998-1999), China's oil demand shock induced a fall in the real oil price of roughly 10 percent. The largest positive effect of China's oil demand shock on the real oil price is observed in the middle of year 2000. From November 1999 to July 2000, China's oil demand shock contributed to an increase of over 10 percent in the real oil price. Between the year 2002 and 2005, the real oil price experienced small increases, not more than five percent, due to China's demand shock. When the real oil price spiked from mid-2007 to mid-2008, China's oil demand shock actually lowered the real oil price from its trend by five percent. From late 2008 to 2009, China's oil demand has quickly recovered, perhaps as a result of its stimulus packages, and helped pull up the real oil price by three to four percent. Consistent with our impulse responses and forecast error variance decomposition analysis, the biggest contribution to the evolution of the real oil price is from other oil demand shocks. During the period Jan 2007-mid 2008, other oil demand shocks caused the real oil price to rise dramatically by about 65 percent.
Results from Out-of-sample Granger Causality Tests
To investigate the causal relationship between China's net oil import growth and the real price of oil, we perform a variety of out-of-sample Granger causality tests based on the VAR(3) model (Eq. (1)). The first three observations in the year of 1998 are reserved for creating lagged variables. The 81 sample observations from April 1998 to December 2004 are used as the in-sample period for model estimation, and the remaining 66 observations over the period from January 2005 to June 2010 are reserved as the out-of-sample period for forecast accuracy evaluation. In particular, we use recursive one-step-ahead forecast errors in the forecast accuracy evaluation. Table 3 reports the sample test statistics along with their p-values from the out-of-sample tests of Granger causality between China's net oil import growth and the real oil price. The left column presents the testing results for the null hypothesis of no Granger causality from China's net oil import growth to the real oil price, and the right column shows the results for the null hypothesis of no Granger causality from the real oil price to China's net oil import growth. The reported p-values are for rejecting the null hypothesis and are obtained using the bootstrapped sampling distributions of the listed test statistics. A p-value less than five (ten) percent means that the null hypothesis of no Granger causality can be rejected and thus there is evidence in favour of Granger causality running from one variable to the other at the significance level of five (ten) percent.
With regard to the null hypothesis of nonexistence of Granger causality from China's net oil import growth to the real oil price, none of the out-of-sample test statistics are significant at the ten percent level, indicating that China's net oil import growth does not have a significant amount of predictive power for the movement of the real oil price. Thus, there is no out-of-sample evidence for China's net oil import growth Granger causing changes in the real oil price. The 11. For example, Platts releases its monthly calculation of China's apparent demand between the 18th and 26th of every month via press release and via its website. In a news report on August 25, 2010, Bloomberg reports "China's apparent crude demand growth may slow 'noticeably' in the third quarter". We are aware that Table 3a of the EIA short-term energy outlook contains data on China's oil consumption at monthly frequencies. However, a closer look reveals that until 2003 the data appear to be derived from quarterly statistics as the monthly numbers within a quarter are all identical before 2004. results are fairly similar with respect to Granger causality running from the real oil price to China's net oil import growth. Again, none of the test statistics are statistically significant at the ten percent level, meaning that there is no Granger causality from the real oil price to China's net oil import growth, either.
Robustness Checks
A potential concern over the above analysis is that we didn't consider the impact of demand growth from the rest of the world. In this subsection we evaluate the robustness of our findings regarding the relationship between China's oil demand and the real oil price using alternative model specifications. One robustness check is to use China's share of oil consumption in the world to replace China's net oil import growth. The monthly world consumption data is also available from the EIA. Since there are no official statistics on oil inventory changes at monthly frequencies in China, we follow practices by many industry analysts and compute China's oil consumption share of the world on the basis of China's apparent consumption which is the sum of domestic production and net import. 12. The monthly series of China's oil consumption share of the world starts from January 1997. Unit root tests finds that China's oil consumption share of the world is trend stationary. We thus use its detrended component in our VAR analysis. On the basis of AIC, two lags are included in the VAR model.
We then estimate a VAR(2) model over the period March 1997-June 2010 using the growth rate of world oil production (WDPROG), the detrended China's oil consumption share of the world (DTCNSHARE) and also the detrended log real oil price (DTLRWTI).
12 Another robustness check is to see whether our main results are sensitive to the inclusion of oil consumption growth rate from the rest of the world. The monthly data of oil consumption from the rest of the world (referred to as "ROW" for short) is also drawn from the EIA and its growth rate is added to our baseline VAR model. For each of these two VAR models, we then conduct innovation accounting and out-of-sample Granger causality tests. In gen- eral, our robustness checks yield similar results to those from the baseline model. That is, China's oil demand shock has statistically insignificant impact on the real oil price, and there is no Granger causality at either direction between the two variables.
Figures 4 and 5 exhibit the impulse responses of the real oil price to various shocks obtained from the VAR(2) model that uses China's oil consumption share of the world and the VAR(3) model that includes ROW oil consumption growth, respectively. In both cases the real oil price responds very little to China's oil demand shock. We also graph the historical decomposition of fluctuations in the real oil price from the two VAR models in Panels A and B of Figure 6 , respectively. Again, we observe that the contribution of China's oil demand shock remain very small in both cases.
In Table 4 we report forecast error variance decomposition of the real oil price due to each of the identified shocks based on the two VAR models. While the explanatory power of China's oil demand shocks for the variation in the real oil price obtained from the VAR(3) model that includes ROW oil consumption growth is very similar to that from the baseline VAR model, the proportion of variation in the real oil price due to China's oil demand shock becomes much smaller in the VAR(2) model that uses China's oil consumption share of the world, accounting for less than one percent of the forecast error variance of the real oil price at any horizons. Table 5 reports the out-of-sample test results on Granger causality between China's oil consumption share of the world and the real oil price from the two VAR models. Again, there is no statistically significant evidence for a Granger 13. In the appendix, we give a detailed graphic exposition. Also see Smith (2009) . 14. We interpret five-year as an intermediate period as it takes about three to five years to develop (e.g. drilling development wells and building production facilities) an oil field that has already been discovered.
causal relationship between the two variables as none of the test statistics have p-values lower than ten percent.
ANALYSIS OF LONGER-TERM DEMAND AND SUPPLY SHIFT
In the above analysis, we investigate the interaction between the growth rate of China's net oil import and the deviation of the logged real oil price from its linear trend. To the extent that China's import has contributed to the trend of oil prices, our statistical results may understate the impact of China's oil import. After all, China's import growth accounts for nearly 30 percent of the increase in world oil consumption between 2002 and 2008. To further evaluate the longerterm impact of China's import growth on oil price changes, we calculate the percentage changes in oil prices that are needed to bring supply up to meet China's growing demand based on some plausible estimates of supply elasticity.
By definition of elasticity, for a positive demand shock to the global oil market (DQ w ), to restore equilibrium the price must rise by where
and g d denote the elasticity of supply and demand, respectively, and Q w is the equilibrium quantity demanded in the world. If China's share in DQ w is s, then the price change attributable to China is . Since the observed change
in China's import should have incorporated the movement along the demand curve, the change in oil price attributable to China's import growth is . 13 Given reasonable estimates of supply and demand elasticities, DCNIMP/Q w g s we can quantify the price changes implied by China's net import growth.
Estimates of long-run supply elasticity typically range from 0.10 to 0.35. For example, using an error correction model Krichene (2002) finds that the longrun supply elasticity of crude oil is 0.10 during . In an analysis on the impact of China's growing demand on US petroleum markets, the US Congressional Budget Office (hereafter, US CBO, 2006) adopts a five-year supply elasticity of 0.2. Smith (2009) uses 0.3 in his analysis of the long-run demand and supply shifts in the oil market since 1970s. In our calculation, we assume the five-year supply elasticity ranges between 0.2 and 0.1.
14 In panel (a) of Figure 7 , we show the range of price changes (in percentage) implied by the five-year changes in China's net import from 2002 to June 2010. The lower and upper bounds correspond to supply elasticities of 0.2 and 0.1 respectively. To eliminate the influence of seasonal variations, both DCNIMP and Q w are calculated on a 12-month moving average basis. For example, the value of DCNIMP for June 15. If Q w is calculated in an arc elasticity fashion, that is, the average world consumption of the beginning and the ending five-year period, the percentage in quantity DCNIMP/Q w would be smaller.
16. The correlation coefficient between the two series is 0. Figure 7 , we also plot the historical five-year changes in prices (DP/P) where both DP and P are defined in a similar way to DCNIMP and Q w .
Two features are worth commenting. First, for most of the time during this period, the price change implied by growth in China's net import is between 10 and 25 percent depending on the assumed supply elasticity. The mean implied five-year price change due to China's import growth is 11 percent for a supply elasticity of 0.2 and 22 percent for a supply elasticity of 0.1. In comparison, the average historical five-year price change during the same period is 96 percent. In other words, approximately 11-23 percent of the historical price changes after 2002 are attributable to the growth in China's net import under reasonable estimates of crude supply elasticity.
Second, although there is good correlation between the price changes implied by China's net oil import and the historical changes in real oil prices, there are important differences. 16 For example, when the real oil price spiked in 2008 the 12-month moving average of the real oil price in September 2008 was 202 percent higher than in September 2003. In contrast, the price increase implied by China's net import growth ranges between 12 and 24 percent over this period. Therefore, about 6-12 percent of the price spike in mid-2008 can be attributed to the growth in China's net import. The result is consistent with our findings from the VAR analysis that China's oil demand shocks actually lowered the oil price from its trend in the price spike of 2008.
This result, while suggesting the "China factor" indeed plays an important role in the crude oil price run-up after 2002, indicates that there are other important factors responsible for the dramatic changes in crude oil price. Of particular note, is that the world crude oil production remained largely flat between mid-2005 and early-2008 despite a more than 100% increase in the real oil price. As argued by Hamilton (2009a) and Smith (2009) , the failure for crude production to respond to oil price increases appears to have less to do with oil depletion than with restrained investment in some OPEC countries.
CONCLUSION
It is often asserted that China's growing demand for oil is one of the major reasons for the rapid rise in crude oil prices in the past decade. In this paper, we make use of monthly data on China's net oil import from January 1997 to June 2010 to assess the relative importance of the "China factor" to the evolution of the real oil price during this period. In the first part of our analysis, we examine the interaction between the growth rate of China's net oil import and the deviation of the real oil price from its linear trend under a VAR framework. We find that the response of the real oil price to China's oil demand shocks is small and statistically insignificant and that only a small fraction of the forecast error variance of the real oil price is attributable to China's oil demand shocks. Furthermore, the historical decomposition indicates that the largest positive effect of China's oil demand shock on the deviation of the real oil price from its trend occurred in 2000. Between 2002 and 2005 , no more than five percent of the price increase in the real oil price was induced by China's demand shocks. When the oil price spiked in 2008, China's demand shocks actually lowered the oil price from its linear trend. In addition, our out-of-sample tests find no evidence for Granger causality between China's oil demand and the real oil price.
The second part of our analysis calculates the price changes implied by increases in China's net oil import from a longer-term supply and demand shift perspective. Under plausible assumptions of long-term price elasticity of crude oil supply, approximately 11-23 percent of the historical price changes between 2002 and mid-2010 are attributable to the growth in China's net oil import. Consistent with the result from the historical decomposition of the VAR analysis, the contribution of the "China factor" to the real oil price is even smaller in the price spike of 2008.
Our analysis casts doubt on the popular view that the demand growth from China is the predominant reason for the dramatic oil price increase between 2002 and 2008. Notwithstanding, if China's demand growth continues its trend, it could play a bigger role in the future especially when it is combined with rigid crude oil supply.
